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MEMORANDUM

Intellectual Dissent in the USSR--Does it Have a Future?

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Intellectual Dissent in the USSR -- Does it Have a Future?

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

5 March 1971

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Intellectual Dissent in the USSR -- Does it Have a Future?*

Introductory Note

Among the paladins of intellectual protest against the Soviet bureaucratic regime, three have become especially well known outside the USSR: a writer, Alexander Solzhenitsyn (First Circle); an historian, Andrey Amalrik (Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?); and a nuclear physicist, Andrey Sakharov (Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom). There is no way of knowing how many others, or how few, each of them in his own way speaks for, or how far their message has traveled within their own country. They have all delivered well aimed blows against the existing order but they are far from having shaken the pillars of the establishment.

While intellectual dissent does not represent a clear and present danger to the Soviet state, it has grown to represent something more than a nuisance and an embarrassment. The regime has been obliged to take it seriously because it has become increasingly political in content and because it has spread from what the regime probably once regarded as a small band of scruffy scribblers into the ranks of the intellectual elite. Clearly, the ruling group has cause for concern that, among these, members of the so-called

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* This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated within CIA.

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scientific-technical intelligentsia are particularly heavily represented. As a domestic problem intellectual dissent has taken a place beside some of the regime's other domestic preoccupations -- economic and technological progress, the ideological temper of Soviet youth, labor discipline and the status of the minority nationalities -- with which, indeed, it has some common origins.

This memorandum sketches the background of this development, describes some of the issues raised by the dissidents, and speculates about the possible impact of dissent on the regime. Excerpts from several prominent examples of the documents of dissent are contained in an annex.

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The Nature of Dissent

1. Last spring in Leningrad a Soviet mathematical-scientist esteemed in his profession was brought before one of the local Party secretaries for questioning after some underground literature was found in his quarters. His name, apt or ironic, was Revolt I. Pimenov (he had already a record of rebelliousness, if not revolt, having been confined in 1949 to a psychiatric hospital for a political misdemeanor). In the course of the interview, the Party man delivered a crude verdict: "We naturally haven't enough power to make all people think alike, but we still have enough power not to let people commit acts which will harm us." Pimenov's case is typical of the present phase of dissent. He is a scientist with an interest in and access

to unofficial literature. His arrest -- to which the encounter just described was a prelude -- was publicly and emphatically protested by a number of his fellow scientists, including Andrey D. Sakharov, called by some the "father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb." And a description of the proceedings against him was disseminated in the leading clandestine publication of the dissident movement.

2. The Party secretary's words themselves tell a story about the state of dissidence. He was right about the power of the authorities: a Soviet court subsequently sentenced Pimenov to five years in exile, despite his colleagues' protests. But the secretary also ackowledged that there are limits on the Party's capacity to control thought. Notwithstanding the regime's repressive tactics during the last five years or so -- some would call its policies in this area "neo-Stalinist" -- dissent has not diminished but has spread in ever-widening circles across the entire Soviet intelligentsia. And its character has changed. What had begun in the '50s as a small-scale revolt against restrictions on artistic freedom had, from the mid-'60s onward, developed into a quest for broad political, social, and economic reform. In the early days of protest the moving spirits had been a handful of creative artists, mainly young writers

little known in the Soviet literary world. They soon succeeded, however, in arousing the sympathy of more illustrious writers and artists, with thanks due, no doubt, to the Party's persecution of them. And eventually a number of eminent members of the Soviet scientific community -- who had their own special complaints about Party controls -- took up the cause of the literary rebels on the grounds that was at issue was not literary standards but civil rights.

3. During the last year or two, a variety of critical currents which had been swirling more or less unnoticed in the several sectors of the intellectual elite have been brought together by a shared concern for the defense of individual rights against the encroachments of the Party bureaucracy. The result has been the politicization of dissent and its extension into areas which touch on basic questions of the Soviet political, social, and economic order. Criticism of the established order has, moreover, led increasingly to the elaboration of concrete proposals for structural changes. Dissent has tended to become both more consistent and more self-assertive and to acquire a strong moral impulse. Some of its manifestations recall the practices, persistence, and fervor of the pre-Revolutionary underground. And out of this has emerged something which calls itself the "democratic

movement," not an organized political opposition but a network for the exchange of ideas. Communications within this network have been greatly improved by the creation of a kind of house organ, the quite remarkable clandestine publication, Chronicle of Current Events, which has, in turn, begun to spawn other publications of a similar nature (e.g., those now being put out by both Ukrainian and Jewish dissidents). The dissidents have made publicity one of their prime tasks.

4. There is no way of knowing how many people are involved in this movement. This may not even be the crucial question. What is clear is that it touches the sympathies and represents the aims of a fairly broad cross section of the Soviet intelligentsia. Thus, while the authorities could almost certainly crush it if they chose to do so, this might now require a resort to repression on a scale which would be costly to the regime, partly in terms of international prestige, but, more important, in the alienation of vital elements of Soviet society.

The Evolution of Dissent

5. The creative protest which got under way in the '50s, especially after Khrushchev's attack on Stalin's reputation at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, did not begin to move

conspicuously onto political terrain until the mid-'60s. The Sinyavsky-Daniel trial in 1966 was a critical event. No doubt the regime considered itself genuinely provoked by these two writers who had not only satirized Soviet life but had compounded their offense by smuggling their satires out of the country to foreign publishers. Despite the intermittent outbursts of intolerance, the Khrushchev years had encouraged the growth of a spirit of iconoclasm. His successors had decided that the time had come to draw the line. They intended the writers' trial to have a shock effect and they succeeded. But the trial dramatized the point as it had not been dramatized before that what was being contested was not merely an issue of cultural standards -- the canons of "socialist realism" -- but the right of the state to control artistic creation and individual expression. By taking up the writer's challenge the regime took an important step toward politicizing the literary issue.

6. In many quarters within the USSR, the trial was seen as a portent that harsher restrictions might be imposed on intellectual activity in general. The suspicion was reinforced by indications that a move was afoot within the Party leadership to undertake a full-dress rehabilitation of Stalin's reputation at the 23rd Party Congress in the spring

of 1966. Protests against the imprisonment of the two writers were unsuccessful but those relating to the Stalin issue evidently had some effect since the issue was for the most part left to lie low. Prominent figures from the Soviet cultural and scientific communities for the first time associated themselves with the protests, especially the efforts to block the revival of Stalin's reputation; among them were Soviet literary luminaries, such as Paustovsky and Chukovsky (both now dead), the prima ballerina Plisetskaya, and from the scientific community, Sakharov and his senior colleague Petr Kapitsa.

7. Trepidation and agitation persisted as the regime continued to apply sanctions against dissident writers. It even provided a new cause celebre in 1968 with the Ginsburg-Galanskov trial, which was an extension of the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial and equally political in character. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was another landmark. A small core of active demonstrators and petitioners had by this time formed. It included such names as Pavel Litvinov, a mathematician (and grandson of the former Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov), Alexander Yesenin-Volpin, also a mathematician (and son of the well-known Russian poet Sergey Yesenin), Natalya Gorbanevskaya, a poetess, General Grigorenko

(formerly a teacher of cybernetics at the Frunze Military Academy), and Petr Yakir, an historian (and son of a Soviet general executed in the Stalin purges). Most were subjected to severe harassment or arrest. Some became victims of the practice, increasingly favored by the regime and increasingly repugnant to the intellectual community, of declaring dissidents insane (and thus subject to indefinite and arbitrary confinement).

8. The several currents of dissent had, after 1966, moved together into a single stream which, though still broad and diffuse, was unitary in the sense that it represented an urge for "democratization," at the heart of which was the requirement that the Party give up exclusive and detailed management of the country's entire political, social, economic and cultural life. It was no longer a matter of writers seeking wider creative freedom and of scientists, separately, pressing for freer exchange of information, but of many of their number having formed a common front of criticism of the regime on a wide range of issues, often overlapping, outside the areas of their special concerns. Typical of these have been the issues of civil rights, bureaucratization of political, economic and cultural life, of censorship and freedom to travel, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and treatment of

the USSR's minority nationalities, including the issue of anti-Semitism. The convergence of thought and action as between leading dissidents within the creative and scientific-technical intelligentsia was exemplified last year by the mutual support which Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov lent one another: Sakharov protested against Solzhenitsyn's having been, in effect, denied his Nobel prize by the Soviet government, (as did the internationally renowned cellist, Rostropovich), and Solzhenitsyn associated himself with the Committee for Human Rights of which Sakharov is one of the founding members.

9. To one or another degree, nearly all the dissidents object to the scope of Party control and in one form or another nearly all have expressed scorn for the narrow and stifling outlook of the typical Party bureaucrat. This is a major unifying theme of the protest, and, politically, its most significant aspect. Another, important in its own right, but also highly convenient in tactical terms, is the call for the upholding of the civil rights guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution and of the provisions on human rights embodied in the UN's Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man. Sakharov and his collaborators set up their Committee for Human Rights under this standard* as had already the Action

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* See Annex A.

Group for the Defense of the Rights of Man in the USSR (founded in 1968). And the Chronicle of Current Events also dedicates itself to these principles and so declares in its masthead.

The Chronicle of Current Events

10. The Chronicle has appeared regularly at bi-monthly intervals since April 1968. It is the most important example of politically-oriented "samizdat" (uncensored, privately published, i.e., underground) literature that the dissident movement has produced, and, indeed, to the extent that something as amorphous as the "democratic movement" can have a mouthpiece, the Chronicle is it. It has been called a "civil rights newsletter." Each issue contains reports of interrogations, arrests, harassments, and administrative penalties and gives news about imprisoned dissidents, and maintains, through brief summaries, an inventory of other "samizdat" literature. In tone and approach it strives for evenness and dispassion. In effect, it is a running account of the struggle between the authorities and Soviet dissidents, aiming not so much at promoting action as at stimulating interest in the cause of civil rights and in preserving a common pool of information.

11. The Chronicle at present runs to an average of 10,000 words an issue. The typewritten copies are circulated to recipients who are expected to produce additional typewritten copies and to disseminate these in the manner of a chain letter. In this way, copies proliferate. Those who have information to transmit for future issues of the Chronicle are instructed to send it back through the same links in such a way as to provide maximum protection against compromise of the network: "....every one who is interested in seeing that the Soviet public is informed of events in the country can easily transmit information available to him to the Chronicle. Give the news to the person from whom you get your copy, and he will pass it on to his supplier, etc. Only do not try personally to reach the top of the chain, in order that you shall not be thought to be an informer."

12. The arrests of some of the disseminators and at least one of the editors of the Chronicle have been reported, but its publication has continued without interruption. Its reports indicate that it has sources of information throughout the USSR and that information often reaches the editors with remarkable speed. It has been conjectured that its editorship and place of origin shifts from issue to issue, but it is generally supposed that it is put together in or

near Moscow. Its method and style have led one American Sovietologist to conclude that scientists or students of science have had a large hand in its publication.

13. The survival of the Chronicle, is not easily explained. It is hard to believe that the Party leadership as a whole is not both well aware of and seriously affronted by its existence or that the KGB would not dearly like to be able to roll it up. This might, it is true, require no small effort given the paper's modus operandi, but, if the effort were made, it would almost certainly succeed sooner or later. It may be that the KGB is biding its time until it is sure that it has identified all the links in the operation. It is just possible also that the Party hierarchy has chosen not to give the KGB the signal to undertake a broad, concerted attack on the problem -- just as it has chosen not to round up each and every known dissenter, even some of the most vociferous ones. But, noteworthy as it is, the Chronicle, is, in any case, only one among many of the mediums of dissent. Though there may be ebbs and flows in "samizdat," the phenomenon itself will surely persist in the USSR until or unless its practicioners are permitted overt outlets.

Extent and Significance of Dissent Among Scientists

14. Sakharov is only the best known and most active of the dissident scientists. There are others, also at the summit of their profession, who have publicly protested against illiberal practices, like Kapitsa, Igor Tamm (a Nobel prize winner), Mikhail Leontovich, Boris Astaurov and Vladimir Englehardt, all members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. There are several lesser eminences: Zhores Medvedev (whose arrest last May elicited a vigorous and successful protest by a number of his fellow scientists), V. F. Turchin (signatory with Sakharov of a 1970 letter to Soviet leaders calling for reform)* and A. N. Tvyordokhlebov (co-founder with Sakharov of the Committee for Human Rights), and the above-mentioned Revolt Pimenov.

15. Behind these men no doubt stand many others, less audacious and less articulate, who are sympathetic to their views. Many Western scientists who have had contact with Soviet colleagues at such places as the "scientific cities" at Obninsk and Novosibirsk have discovered clear signs of resentment of, or at least indifference to, the Party and Party purposes. The Party has confirmed this by making

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* See paragraph 17.

allegations about ideological softness among scientists at both centers. The Chronicle has reported that members of these centers, which have a high proportion of young scientists who have been favored by some of the best facilities and emoluments, have in great numbers signed the many protest petitions addressed to the regime in recent years. According to the Chronicle the regime has retaliated by demanding the resignation of a number of faculty members at the Physical Mathematical School at Novosibirsk, and by closing down the Department of Mathematical Linguistics there. More recently, the Party directed a stern rebuke, charging ideological laxness, at the Lebedev Institute of Physics, believed to be the home base of Sakharov, Igor Tamm and other scientific notables.

16. It may well be that to the greatest part of the Soviet scientific-technical elite these attitudes and behavior seem strange and even offensive. To many of them Sakharov must seem an eccentric figure. No doubt many in the profession, as in other professions, are intimidated, unaware of or indifferent to the issues raised by the dissidents, more preoccupied with their own particular professional concerns and in preserving the serenity of their daily lives. The scientific bureaucracy is without doubt dominated by

careerists who will use their authority to protect the status quo and the many advantages they derive from it. But while the forces of inertia are strong, it is also apparent that the appeal for liberalization and "democratization" has had considerable resonance within this community. It is not hard to see why this should be so. Professional self-interest alone would incline many of them to favor freer exchange of knowledge within the USSR and between the USSR and the rest of the world, as well as greater ease of foreign travel. Many have no doubt asked themselves the question raised in Khrushchev Remembers: is there really any need for the USSR at this stage to "lock the doors" against the outside world? And, the scientific bureaucrats apart, probably nowhere would the prospect of some relief from the Party's stultifying controls and petty tutelage be more welcome than in the scientific community and among the members of contiguous professions, e.g. the mathematical economists (whose services are important to the regime, among other ways, in connection with computerization and the improvement of managerial techniques).

Programs for Reform

17. It is not surprising that Sakharov as the leading scientist in the dissident movement should have come forward

with not only a clear and rational critique of the Soviet system but a carefully reasoned set of proposals for reform. These are set forth in his Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom (1968) and his letter (co-signed by V. F. Turchin and R. A. Medvedev) addressed to Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny in 1970.* Sakharov does not claim that the proposals offered by him and his collaborators are endorsed by any part of the Soviet scientific community but he clearly implies that his thoughts are widely shared by the Soviet intellectual elite as a whole. (He says, for instance, in the course of a denunciation of one of the Party's ranking and most dogmatic overseers of Soviet scientists, that this man's views differ from those "of the majority and most active sections of the intelligentsia, which, in our opinion, reflect the true interests of all our people and progressive mankind.")

18. At the same time, Sakharov professes to speak from the position of a concerned but loyal Soviet scientist, interested in the rationalization of existing structures and evolutionary change. He argues that the Soviet state needs to reform itself in order to prosper and survive. He

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* See Annexes B and C.

appeals to the regime's self-interest and contends that the reforms he proposes will strengthen the Party and state. But these proposals are nonetheless far-reaching -- amounting to a prescription for democratic socialism and a substantial reduction of the Party's monopoly on political power. They are sure to be regarded by the Party rulers as poison where they call, for example, for the curtailment of censorship and a reduction of the Party's intervention throughout the system; allow for the possibility of political competition; and foresee approvingly the convergence of the Soviet and US systems.

19. Less well known than Sakharov's declarations are certain other documents, also programmatic in nature, which have circulated in the "samizdat" network and have been summarized in the Chronicle of Current Events. These propose for the most part considerably more radical solutions entailing the replacement of the present system on the assumption that it can never reform itself. An example of these is the Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union (1969). There is a suspicion that its anonymous authors, who sign themselves "Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine and the Baltic Regions," may, in fact, be Baltic nationalists. Though some of its proposals (e.g., reconciliation between

East and West) resemble Sakharov's it is altogether more denunciatory of the existing regime, calling it "a profoundly anti-democratic and totalitarian-dictatorial social organization," and goes considerably farther in demands for a reordering of the political and economic structure.*

The Dissidents' Possibilities

20. Obviously, the present and potential significance of Soviet dissidence can be overestimated. The publicity which the dissidents have sought through playback from the Western press has no doubt helped them in their aim of dramatizing their case within the USSR but it may also have created an exaggerated impression of their numbers and strength. Brave and vocal as they are, they are also, by any reckoning, a tiny minority and they have little hope of finding wide support among the population at large. Outside the few centers of high concentration of intellectuals -- e.g., Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, the scientific city at Novosibirsk -- the links between the outposts of dissidence are no doubt thin and vulnerable. The dissidents do not constitute an organized political movement and, indeed, in present conditions would be condemning their movement to extinction if

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* See Annex D.

they attempted to give it solid organizational form. It may be only a matter of time before the KGB finds a way to pull up the Chronicle of Current Events by the roots.

21. Even if this does not happen, it seems likely that as the dissidents continue to move beyond the stage of agreement on certain general humanistic and liberal principles, more and more issues will arise to divide and disrupt them. The force of Russian nationalism may come to assert itself among the dissidents as a counterweight to reformist zeal. (Already Alamrik, who berates the Russian people as well as the Party state in his Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?, seems to have gotten a fairly cool reception in the pages of the Chronicle.) And, even if they do not come under severe repression, some of the dissidents may in time be discouraged by the Soviet state's massive resistance to change.

Responses Open to the Regime

22. In an out and out tug-of-war with the regime, the dissidents would be hopelessly outclassed. But it might very well not come to that, and, meantime, the weakness is not all on the dissident side. The regime's selected repression has so far not only not worked but has succeeded in generating an

increasingly sophisticated dissidence, in forcing it more and more into unmistakably political channels, and in strengthening its moral cohesiveness. The regime's frustration and anger have been rising. Theoretically, it could turn a lot tougher, but this may not be a practical possibility. The Party leadership seems disinclined to run the risk of arousing a wider antagonism among the Soviet intelligentsia by attacking the dissidents full force and probably feels some reluctance to court the international opprobrium which a harder policy would bring down on it. It is doubtful, also that many in the Party leadership would be willing to see the KGB fully unleashed.

23. The increasing involvement of the scientific-technical elite in the movement for "democratization" makes it all the more difficult for the regime to find an effective response. It may be little impressed by Sakharov's warning that, if it fails to reform, it will open up an "unbridgeable gap" between itself and the intelligentsia. But it needs, and knows it needs, the scientists and technicians to help it in modernizing the economy and in keeping up in the technological

race with the West.* It cannot afford, therefore, to put itself seriously at odds with this vital group. It is symptomatic of this awareness that, whereas Solzhenitsyn has been denounced and denied a meium of expression, and Amalrik is in confinement, Sakharov has so far been left pretty much untouched.

24. The chances are that the regime will both refuse to indulge dissent and fail to find effective ways to suppress it. The leadership's approach to the problem has betrayed some uncertainty within its own ranks as to whether it can better be confined by relatively moderate or relatively severe methods. Even within this fairly narrow spectrum of choices, there has probably been room for debate within the Politburo, not, certainly, as to whether the Party should encourage criticism of its prerogatives, but as to how far to tolerate dissent for the sake of insuring the loyalty of the intelligentsia. The consensual instinct of the present leadership seems to be to temporize, in the hope

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* Cf., for example, Brezhnev's speech in December 1968: "One can say without exaggeration that it is....in the field of scientific and technological progress that one of the main fronts of the historic contest of the two systems lies today. ...At the present stage, questions of scientific and technical progress acquire, to put it bluntly, a decisive importance."

that the problem can be kept manageable through the application, at a rising rate if necessary, of verbal threats, Party sanctions, administrative penalties and selective arrests. But, it will probably remain reluctant to launch a campaign of full-scale repression. If this is so, the Party leaders may approach the issue at the Party Congress beginning in March by combining threats against ideological backsliders with implicit assurances against a reversion to Stalinist methods of repression. This would be to leave matters essentially where they are.

25. It is impossible to know what dimensions the dissident movement will achieve in future years or whether it will ever become a dynamic force for change within the USSR. It is now at best only the nucleus of such a force. It might succeed in becoming a tangible political influence only if something happened to cause the regime to suffer a loss of self-confidence: an economic crisis, a severe political struggle, or a grave international setback. But even in the absence of such hypothetical contingencies, there is no reason to suppose that the ideas which have animated the dissidents will simply dissolve. The opposite is more likely, that is, that many of these ideas will not only persist but will spread among groups which have hitherto been

largely impervious to them, e.g., the managerial bureaucracy. There can be little doubt that they will find a fairly wide response among the oncoming generation of all classes to many of whom the moral and practical values represented by the Party clearly seem hollow, hypocritical or just plain dull. Active dissent, though more dramatic and eloquent, is surely less pervasive, and perhaps less worrisome to the regime, than the more impassive forms of dissent which have produced a noticeable apathy among young people and workers. These problems also arise to a great extent from a sense that the present reality provided by the Party is wan and unexciting while its once bright vision of the future is badly tarnished.

26. Many of the issues raised by the dissidents -- those having to do, for example, with freedom of information and travel, and the extent of bureaucratic control -- will, in any event, continue to agitate the scientific-technical elite. To the extent that this group has a concern for and holds many of the keys to economic and technological progress, its aims and those of the Party overlap. It may be that via this route reformist notions will begin to seep into the Party itself, which is to say, into the organization which remains the most likely agency of meaningful change in the Soviet system, if there is to be change. Perhaps a small

omen of this has been seen in the involvement of Vitaly Shelest -- nuclear-scientist-son of the uncompromisingly orthodox head of the Ukrainian Party -- in a public discussion of the desirability of the freer exchange of scientific information.

27. Receptiveness on the part of the Party bureaucracy to some of the dissenters' ideas for reform is likely to be greater -- as in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland -- where these bear on the imperatives of economic and technological progress, and where the Party might believe, perhaps mistakenly, that it can rationalize its economic and managerial techniques without introducing essential political changes. There are no doubt already some within the upper echelons of the Party apparatus, if not at the very top, and probably many more among the younger generation of Party functionaries, who recognize the need for modernization of the Soviet state structure. It would be surprising if the dissidents had not succeeded in planting some germs in the minds, conscious or unconscious, of Party men of this type.

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28. Domestic intellectual dissent is probably capable of altering the USSR's international behavior only in a

subtle, and perhaps at this stage, only a slight way. Although it deserves to be numbered among the regime's internal preoccupations, the presence of which impose some restraints on Soviet foreign policies, its impact is less obvious and less direct than, say, economic concerns. It can safely be assumed that the Party leaders have even less regard for the dissidents' views on such questions as liberalization in Eastern Europe, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and international reconciliations (on which the dissidents more or less consistently diverge from official positions) than for their views on domestic matters. Though it has grown in specifically Soviet soil, dissent has clearly been nourished by Western influences. Though neither Solzhenitsyn, Amalrik nor Sakharov has ever travelled in the West and each conceives of his mission as lying within the Russian milieu, they all espouse certain libertarian values which are part of the Western, not of the Soviet or Russian, tradition. Of this the regime is surely aware and to this extent its fear of contamination through contact with the West has no doubt been reinforced.

29. It can be said again that it is well within the means of the regime to contain the more forward and provocative forms of intellectual dissent. But the importance of

dissent may lie less in its present possibilities and immediate impact than in the fact that it is simply the most visible manifestation of pressures for change which have gathered force among key elements of the Soviet elite. Again the question arises: can the regime refuse to accommodate the urges of the scientific-technical intelligentsia? Certainly not altogether. Among these is the urge for broader and more normal discourse with Western counterparts. By lowering the barriers in this area -- as, sooner or later, it will probably have to do -- the regime may also, despite itself, lower the barriers to more normal political intercourse with its Western antagonists.

ANNEX A

Principles of the Committee for Human Rights established by Sakharov, V. N. Chalidze and A. N. Tvyordokhlebov, November 1970.

"Proceeding from the conviction that the problem of the maintenance of human rights is important for the creation of favorable conditions for peoples' lives, and that the consolidation of peace and the development of mutual understanding is an inalienable area of contemporary culture;

Seeking to cooperate with international efforts to propagate the idea of human rights and the search for constructive methods of maintaining rights;

Noting the growing interest in this field of culture in recent years among Soviet citizens;

Expressing satisfaction with successes achieved in the Soviet Union since 1955 in this field of law and seeking to cooperate on a consultative basis with the further efforts of the state in the creation of guarantees for the defense of rights, taking into account the specific character of the problem in the conditions of a socialist system and the specific character of Soviet traditions in this field, A. D. Sakharov, A. N. Tvyordokhlebov, V. N. Chalidze have decided jointly to continue their activity in the constructive study of the problem as a Committee for Human Rights on the basis of the following principles:

1. The Committee for Human Rights is a creative association acting in accordance with the laws of the state, the present principles and regulations of the Committee.

2. Members of the Committee may be persons guided, when they act as members of the Committee, by the present

principles and regulations, who are neither members of a political party or other organization which claims participation in the management of the government nor of organizations whose principles allow participation in orthodox or oppositional political activity. Who do not intend to use their participation in the Committee for political goals.

3. The goals of activity of the Committee are:

Cooperation with organs of state power in the field of the creation and application of guarantees of human rights either at the initiative of the Committee or the initiative of interested organs of power,

Creative assistance to persons concerned with the constructive research of theoretical aspects of the problem of human rights and the study of the specific aspects of this problem in the socialist society,

Legal education, in particular, propagation of the documents of international and Soviet law on human rights.

4. In theoretical research and constructive criticism of the contemporary condition of the system of legal guarantees of personal freedom in Soviet law, the Committee

Will be guided by the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Will proceed from recognition of the specifics of Soviet law

Will take into account the complicated traditions and real difficulties of the state in this area.

5. The Committee is prepared for creative contacts with public and scientific organizations and with international nongovernmental organizations if in their activities they proceed from the principles of the United Nations and do not pursue the goal of bringing harm to the Soviet Union."

ANNEX B

Sakharov's proposals as summarized by him in Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom, June 1968.

1. "The strategy of peaceful coexistence and collaboration must be deepened in every way. Scientific methods and principles of international policy will have to be worked out, based on scientific prediction of the immediate and more distant consequences.

2. The initiative must be seized in working out a broad program of struggle against hunger.

3. A law on press and information must be drafted, widely discussed, and adopted, with the aim not only of ending irresponsible and irrational censorship, but of encouraging self-study in our society, fearless discussions, and the search for truth. The law must provide for the material resources of freedom of thought.

4. All anticonstitutional laws and decrees violating human rights must be abrogated.

5. Political prisoners must be amnestied and some of the recent political trials must be reviewed (for example, the Daniel-Sinyavsky and Ginsburg-Galanskov cases). The camp regime of political prisoners must be promptly relaxed.

6. The exposure of Stalin must be carried through to the end, to the complete truth, and not just to the carefully weighed half-truth dictated by caste considerations. The influence of neo-Stalinists in our political life must be restricted in every way (the text mentioned, as an example, the case of S. Trapeznikov, who enjoys too much influence).

7. The economic reform must be deepened in every way and the area of experimentation expanded, with conclusions based on the results.

8. A law on geohygiene must be adopted after broad discussion, and ultimately become part of world efforts in this area."

ANNEX C

Proposals put forward in letter to Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny from Sakharov, Turchin and Medvedev, March 1970.

1. "A statement from the highest Party and government authorities on the necessity of further democratization and on its rate and methods. Publication in the press of a number of articles discussing the problems of democratization.

2. Restricted distribution (through Party and Soviet organs, enterprises, and administrations) of information on the state of the country and of theoretical work on public issues which should not be made a subject of a wide discussion. Later access to this type of material should be gradually broadened and restrictions finally abolished altogether.

3. An end to the jamming of foreign broadcasts. Free sale of foreign books and periodicals. Entry of our country into the international copyright system. Gradual (3-4 years) expansion of international tourism in both directions. Unrestricted international correspondence and other measures for the expansion of international contacts having in mind first priority for COMECON countries.

4. Establishment of an institute for the study of public opinion with initially restricted but eventually complete publication of material showing the attitude of the population to the most important problems of internal and external policy, and other sociological material as well.

5. Amnesty for political prisoners. A decree on compulsory publication of complete stenographic records of political trials. Public control over the places of imprisonment and psychiatric asylums.

6. Other measures to facilitate the operation of courts and procurators' offices and to insure their independence from the executive power, local influences, prejudice and connections.

7. Elimination of the nationality designation in passports. A single system of passports for urban and rural areas. Gradual elimination of passport registration together with equalization of territorial dissimilarity of economic and cultural development.

8. Thorough-going organization of industrial associations (firms) with a high degree of independence in the problems of industrial planning and production processes, in sales and supplies, finances, and personnel. Expansion of the rights of minor production units. Scientific determination, after thorough research, of the forms and extent of state regulation.

9. Reforms in the field of education. Greater allocation for primary and high schools, improvement of the material situation of teachers, with greater independence and the right to experiment.

10. A law on the press and information, facilitating the establishment of new press organs by public organization and groups of citizens.

11. Improved training of leading cadres versed in the art of management. A probationary system for managers. Improvement of the knowledgeability of leading cadres at all levels and their rights to independence, to experimentation and to the defense of their opinions and the testing of them in practice.

12. Gradual introduction of the nomination of several candidates for a single post in elections to Party and Soviet organs at all levels, including direct elections.

13. Extension of the rights of Soviet organs. Extension of the rights and responsibilities of the USSR Supreme Soviet (Parliament).

14. Restoration of the rights of all nationalities forcibly resettled under Stalin. Restoration of the national autonomy of the resettled nations. Gradual resettlement in former homelands (where it has not yet taken place)."

ANNEX D

Summary of proposals from Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union, 1969.

1. "In the political sphere -- civic liberties and a democratic state which guarantees the observance of the thirty principles of the U.N. Charter of Human Rights;

2. In the economic sphere -- the popular welfare and a three-fold economic system which guarantees the maintenance in equal rights of state, group and personal property in regard to the means of production;

3. In the nationality sphere -- full self-determination and free expression of will by means of referendum;

4. In cultural life -- freedom of creativity and non-interference of the government in the spiritual activities of society;

5. In foreign policy -- reconciliation with the capitalist countries and political self-determination for the socialist countries;

6. In domestic policy -- class peace, equality of rights for all classes and a multi-party political system."

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